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Abstract
There is an ideological divide between the goal of universal access to clean
water and the outcomes of how water regulations are implemented. John Fleck,
author of Water is for Fighting Over: and Other Myths about Water in the West
and Sivas, et al. in California Water Governance in the 21st Century present
contesting prescriptions for Western water management. The ideologies
advocated by Fleck and Sivas, et al. differ as to who enacts and profits from each
and exemplify the divide between the goals of water regulations and how they
are implemented. Fleck regards water as property and an economic good, and
his prescriptions benefit an exclusive network of experts and senior
appropriators. Sivas et al. argue that water is a life-giving public and
environmental good that can only be managed ethically and sustainably if the
public establishes water use priorities. It may be impossible to reconcile these
conflicting perspectives, with Fleck representing the status quo of maintaining
seniority rights-based water allocation systems, and Sivas, et al. championing
democratic water governance.
Keywords: water governance, water management, water justice
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Who Decides: Is Water Life or Capital? Contesting Visions of Western
Water Management in the 21st Century
Introduction
There is an ideological divide between the goal of universal access to clean
water and the results of how water regulations are implemented. What are the
contesting visions that guide Western water management practices, and who
establishes and benefits from them?
“Water is life” is familiar to everyone, but this vision of water means
different things to different people. Some might see it in California’s 2012 Human
Right to Water Act (HRTWA), which states:
It is hereby declared to be the established policy of the state that every
human being has the right to safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water
adequate for human consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes (AB
685, 2012).
California has the world’s fifth-largest economy (Forbes, 2020), but over 1
million of the state’s residents still do not have access to safe, affordable, and
reliable sources of drinking water (State of CA, 2018; Lohan, 2017b). The
HRTWA was adopted to guide policymaking and contains no enforcement
mechanisms. There is a gap between the goals of the HRTWA and what it can
achieve.
The perspective of “water is life” includes the idea that waterways have an
inherent right to exist. The main goal of the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), to
prevent the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s protected waterways by July
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1, 1983, might also be regarded as more aspirational than actual but at least the
CWA contains mechanisms for its enforcement, unlike the HRTWA (Fed. Water
Pollution Control Act, 2002). The toothless vision of “water is life” in the HRTWA
stands in stark contrast to the seniority rights-based management of California’s
waters.
California allocates water based on a complex mix of three main types of
water rights, but the most common, as is the case in other Western states, is
based on the doctrine of prior appropriation. Prior appropriation is often
abbreviated as “first in time, first in right” because the first persons to appropriate
surface waters for “beneficial” uses (i.e. economic: farming, industrial, municipal)
are referred to as senior appropriators, who have priority of access over junior
appropriators. In theory, this means that during times of water scarcity the most
senior appropriators receive their allocations in full while the junior appropriators’
allocations are curtailed (FindLaw, n.d.). Under certain circumstances junior
appropriators may be able to buy water from the more senior appropriators. In
California, particularly during periods of water scarcity senior appropriators
substitute their surface allocations with groundwater and sell their surface
allocations to junior appropriators at inflated rates (Vekshin, 2014; Henry, 2017).
Today there is a race among speculators to acquire California farmlands located
over aquifers, not to produce food but to establish associated groundwater rights
before critical benchmarks are reached in the implementation of the 2014
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) (Arax, 2019; Kelleher,
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2018). This valuation of water as property and capital undermines any vision of
“water is life.”
What follows are two examples of individuals with contesting water visions
and unequal powers to realize their visions, to illustrate the gap between the
water quality and accessibility goals specified in state and federal regulations like
the HRTWA and CWA, and the management of water as property and capital
(Mack and Wrase, 2017; Walton, 2019, Allaire et al., 2018).
Humberto Lugo, member of Comite Civico Del Valle
California’s HRTWA does not apply in Humberto Lugo’s community in
Brawley, California. His residence is one of approximately 3,000 households in
the Imperial Valley that are not connected to a community water system. Instead,
the State has provided an exemption for the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) to
allow these rural households to pump raw water from the IID’s unlined, open
irrigation ditches if the residents can demonstrate that they have a contract with
an approved private water purveyor to receive treated bulk or bottled water for
drinking and cooking (CA OEHHA, 2017). Households such as Lugo’s use the
raw canal water for showering, washing dishes, and cleaning (Lohan, 2017a). It
is not uncommon to see algae, fish, and dead animals in the irrigation canals
(Lohan, 2017a). Contaminants in the canal water include herbicide glyphosate,
the industrial solvent dichloromethane, and concentrations of uranium and
manganese that exceed federal drinking water standards (CA OEHHA, 2017;
Comite Civico Del Valle, 2017). Users of the canal water claim that it smells bad,
stains fabric, and causes infants to develop skin rashes (Lohan, 2017a). Brawley
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is designated as an “environmentally disadvantaged” community, whose
residents have higher than average rates of health problems such as asthma and
heart disease, which increases their vulnerability to the adverse effects of
contaminants (CA OEHHA, 2017).
The cruel irony is that the IID holds some of the most senior water rights
to approximately one-fifth of the total allocated flow of the Colorado River, at 3.1
million acre-feet (Lippert, 2015). The IID has entered into very lucrative
agreements with the city of San Diego and the Southern California Metropolitan
Water District (SCMWD), the largest water broker in the state, to ensure that their
urban clients have a reliable source of clean water (Harkinson, 2014; Lippert,
2015). Humberto Lugo is a member of Comite Civico Del Valle, a nonprofit
organization founded by farmworkers, whose mandate is to educate and
organize Imperial Valley communities regarding health and environmental social
justice issues, such as the lack of safe and affordable sources of water for the
valley’s rural households (Lohan, 2017a). The water vision that the members of
Comite Civico Del Valle are actively pursuing, according to Luis Olmedo, the
organization’s executive director, is for these rural households to have access to
safe drinking water directly from their faucets (Lohan, 2017a). California has
exempted what is arguably the most powerful rights-holder of Colorado River
water, the IID, from being required to service these households in its district with
clean water, unlike the urban communities that purchase water from the IID.
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Ted Kowalski, senior program officer of The Walton Family Foundation
The Walton Family Foundation (WFF) is a philanthropic organization run
by the heirs of Walmart founder Sam Walton, which has dispersed approximately
$100 million in grant money to influence Colorado River policymaking, according
to a 2019 E&E article by Jeremy P. Jacobs. Over the past five years, the Walton
Foundation has:
…funded environmental groups (Environmental Defense Fund: $5.55
million since 2017, National Audubon Society: $2.6 million, Trout
Unlimited: $2.7 million), university research (Yale University: $60,000,
Stanford University: $98,000, Utah State University: $150,000), even
journalists (KUNC, a community radio station for northern Colorado:
$155,000). Earlier this month, the University of Colorado, Boulder,
announced a journalism "water desk." Its funder: Walton ($700,000)
(Jacobs, 2019a).
The WFF supports entities that otherwise might criticize the Foundation’s
involvement in the management of the Colorado River, including government
agencies, environmental groups, journalists, and academics (Dyer, 2018). The
reach of the WFF’s influence extends from support for research, symposia, and
conferences, to river pilot projects (Jacobs, 2019a). The WFF gave $8 million to
an Arizona conservation program that provided crucial assistance for the State of
Arizona to sign on to the 2019 Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan, in
which the seven states that use Colorado River water negotiated shared
cutbacks to prevent water levels in Lake Mead and Lake Powell from dropping to
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critical levels during periods of water scarcity (Jacobs, 2019a; GovTrack.us.,
2019).
The WFF provided almost half of the money for the Colorado River
Sustainability Campaign, which Jacobs describes as “an important behind-thescenes player for environmentalists working on the waterway” to the tune of $4
million (Jacobs, 2019b). This money was funneled through the black box of the
New Venture Fund, which does not disclose the identities of donors or how the
grantees spend their money (2019b). The New Venture Fund coordinates
grantees’ efforts so that they can collaborate more effectively, while it shields
them from political blowback (2019b). For example, The New Venture Fund
coordinated the Colorado River Sustainability Campaign grantees’ response to
IID’s threat to pull out from the Drought Contingency Plan negotiations. The IID
objected to the inclusion of a rider to the agreement that would have waived
environmental laws, as well as the absence of federal funding for environmental
remediation of the Salton Sea (2019b). The drainage from IID farms is directed
into the Salton Sea, but when farmland is fallowed and irrigation water is
redirected to urban communities, the lake shrinks and exposes a bed of toxic
sediments that become airborne pollutants that negatively impact the health of
residents in the Imperial Valley, like the previously-mentioned Humberto Lugo of
Brawley (2019b). Senator Barbara Boxer voiced her opposition to the rider in an
op-ed piece in the district’s local newspaper, but seven environmental groups
that had received either WFF or New Venture funding signed on to a contesting
op-ed piece supporting the rider (2019b). In the end, the Colorado River Drought
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Contingency Plan Authorization Act was approved in May of 2019, but without
the participation of the IID because funds for the remediation of the Salton Sea
were omitted, although the environmental rider was dropped from the agreement.
This is an example of how private money can have more influence on water
policymaking than an elected representative of the U.S. Senate.
Ted Kowalski, the senior program officer for the WFF, is very clear about
the power the WFF wields to shape a grand vision guiding the management of
the Colorado River, and how indispensable the Foundation is for the realization
of that vision. At the invitation-only 2019 Colorado River Symposium, Kowalski
called for a bold “visionary” plan that dispenses with “incrementalism” (Pitzer,
2019). The Water Education Foundation (WEF) sponsors this exclusive, biannual
event at Bishop’s Lodge near Santa Fe, NM, which was the location of the
signing of the Colorado River Compact in 1922. The WEF claims that it is “an
impartial nonprofit organization” whose mission is “…to create a better
understanding of water resources and foster public understanding and resolution
of water resource issues through facilitation, education, and outreach” (WEF,
2018). The organization is funded primarily by California water agencies and
irrigation districts, corporate farmers, and private companies who do not refer to
water “as life” but as an economic good and a resource that provides ecological
services (WEF, 2018). It is reasonable to question why a foundation like the
WEF, who hand-pick the attendees from the seven Western states and Mexico
that use Colorado River water for this three-day event where informal
conversations initiate policymaking that guides the management of a river that
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serves 40 million people. The WEF symposium is closed to the public to
encourage these informal discussions to take place, so the details of Kowalski’s
grand vision for the management of the Colorado River are not known. What is
known is that the first and most important of the four tenets1 of the WFF’s work
on the Colorado River is their advocacy for the creation of water markets
(Jacobs, 2019a).
A more restrained call for a comprehensive vision guiding the
management of the Colorado River than Kowalski’s is outlined in a study funded
by the WFF and authored by Anne Castle, who served as assistant secretary for
water and science in the U.S. Department of the Interior from 2009 to 2014 and
is a senior fellow with the Getches-Wilkinson Center at the University of Colorado
Law School, and co-author John Fleck, director of the University of New Mexico’s
Water Resources Program (Castle and Fleck, 2019). In an email sent to WEF
writer Gary Pitzer, Castle wrote:
I suggest that the best way to proceed is to have an articulated visionary
goal with specific incremental steps to get there… The vision is needed to
guide choices along the way, but it’s not either desirable or realistic to
suddenly make big changes in operations on the river, precipitously
undermining investments and reliance on the previous status quo (Pitzer,
2019).
Castle’s co-author, John Fleck, provides prescriptions for Colorado River
governance in his book, Water is Worth Fighting Over: and Other Myths about
Water in the West (Fleck, 2019). Although he limits his focus to the Colorado
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River Basin, as the title of his book suggests, he intends for his prescriptions for
water governance to be valid generally in the Western states where appropriative
water rights are used. Fleck does not mention the WFF in this book, but his
perspective aligns with the first of the four tenets of the Foundation’s work on the
Colorado River. Like Castle, Fleck believes that the Law of the River2 guiding
Colorado River management should be preserved. He proposes that water
markets, which he refers to as "water-sharing agreements" are central to solving
the problem of the historic overallocation of Colorado River water rights, a
problem that can no longer be ignored because of reduced flows due to climate
change and expanding development in the Western states. Water markets are an
economist’s answer to scarcity, as opposed to government-imposed solutions.
Fleck provides examples throughout his book of why "water-sharing agreements"
would increase the system’s resiliency to the impacts of climate change and
increasing water demands.
A contrasting vision of Western water management is presented in the
Stanford Law School policy paper, California Water Governance for the 21st
Century (Sivas, et al., 2017). Sivas et al. limit their policy paper to water
management in California, but their prescriptions for water governance are valid,
as with Fleck’s, more generally. The authors insist that the public must
democratically determine California’s vision of water management, one that
recognizes water as a life-giving environmental and public good. Sivas et al.
claim that water markets are not a solution to scarcity because the most
profitable uses of water are not the most social and ecologically beneficial uses,
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and that water managed for profit causes environmental degradation and
widening water wealth inequities. The authors do not advocate for the elimination
of water rights but offer a strategy for how socially and ecologically beneficial
uses of water can be prioritized over seniority-based allocations.
An analysis of underlying assumptions that support these two contesting
prescriptions for Western water governance can clarify the ideological divide
between the vision of universal access to clean sources of water, which is
implied, of not explicitly stated in water regulations such as California’s HRTWA
and why those goals are not realized. These two texts present contesting visions
of water management to guide policymaking, as well as who should be entrusted
to carry out these visions and profit from them. Both texts agree that the specter
of climate change-induced water scarcity is a problem, but their prescriptions
create very different outcomes for the physical and economic well-being of
people like Humberto Lugo and Ted Kowalski.
Research Question
What are the assumptions that support the contesting visions of Western
water management presented in the two texts, Water is for Fighting Over: and
Other Myths about Water in the West, and California Water Governance for the
21st Century? This question can be answered by analyzing each text’s position
on the following three key aspects of Western water governance:
1. How does each text define and support their definition of water (i.e., as a
private, economic, public, and/or environmental good)?
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2. How does each text describe the role of expertise in Western water
management?
3. How does each text define what water justice is and its importance?
Methods
This academic multiple book review essay will use the template for the
point-by-point method provided by the USC Library Research Guide,3 in which
the positions of both texts will be compared to each other concerning each of the
three key aspects of Western water governance.
Summaries of the two texts
Water is for Fighting Over: and Other Myths about Water in the West
John Fleck begins and ends his book with a story about international
negotiations that enabled the release of a pulse of water from Lake Mead in
Nevada as an experimental, yet successful attempt to reinvigorate the dry
environment of Mexico’s Colorado River Delta at the river’s outlet into the Gulf of
California. Fleck presents this story to counter several myths about Western
water management that he claims inhibit solving the problem of the
overallocation of the Colorado River. (“Overallocation” means that the water
rights granted on paper are greater than the amount of water available from the
environment.)
Fleck’s (2019) first “myth” is that Western water is inherently “for fighting
over” (p. 6). The story of the 2014 pulse flow is supposed to demonstrate how a
network of professionals--water managers, environmentalists, diplomats, and
other experts—who developed longstanding relationships through ongoing
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informal and formal collaborative efforts, negotiated a solution to a challenging
problem that satisfied their conflicting interests. Fleck (2019) pits this example of
a “win-win’ solution against “winner-take-all fights” in court or through legislation,
which he claims do not get at the root cause of the problem (p. 6).
Another “myth” is that there is not enough water to meet everyone’s
needs, such that “we are about to run out of water” (p. 6). Fleck describes this
myth as the most pernicious because it elicits irrational fears that motivate senior
appropriators to fight to maintain their allocations in full, rather than to collaborate
to achieve broad reductions of water use (p. 6). The 2014 pulse flow occurred
during drought conditions when the water elevation in Lake Mead was lower than
usual. Fleck claims that the people who believe this “myth” do not recognize the
success of conservation efforts that have decoupled urban water use from
population growth in the major cities of the Southwest. He adds that there is still
plenty of slack in the system regarding agricultural uses of water, which can be
reduced through technological solutions, in addition to the implementation of
"water-sharing agreements" that move water from agricultural to urban uses (pp.
6-8, 28).
The third myth is that “water flows uphill towards money” (p. 6). Fleck
seems to suggest that the rules associated with seniority rights-based allocations
are a bulwark against water speculation (pp. 6, 22). He argues that
appropriations for agriculture account for 70-80% of Colorado River water, but
agriculture only contributes 2% to the economies of Western states, so this
demonstrates that senior appropriators are not forced to give up or sell their
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water rights to wealthier cities (p. 6). He does advocate for the creation of
institutions that facilitate the implementation of "water-sharing agreements"
between agricultural and urban water users so that this type of water transfer will
happen voluntarily.
Fleck does not question the effectiveness of prior appropriation, or the
associated perspective that property rights are the best solution for allocating
common-pool resources. He refers to the tragedy of the commons4 as an
explanation of why no state, local, or private entity will voluntarily reduce their
water usage unless there are new rules governing water use throughout the
Colorado River Basin (CRB) that ensure water reductions are shared by
everyone (p. 200). Fleck does provide examples of the effectiveness of sciencebased methods for reducing water used for agricultural irrigation, but he
emphasizes that water use rules and institutional infrastructure must change to
allow water to be “moved from one place to another” as the more important and
challenging problem to be rectified (p. 28).
He insists that solutions cannot and should not be imposed on water users
by the federal government, so the most critical aspect of CRB governance then
becomes “the network” (p. 9). “The network” includes “lawyers, hydrologists,
farmers, water managers, diplomats, and environmentalists” who have cultivated
longstanding collaborative relationships “in conferences, on river trips, and in
hotel bars” (p. 9). The “informal” nature of their interactions deserves emphasis
here, as only those who have acquired the requisite level of “social capital” are
invited to participate in CRB “network governance” (p. 10). The implication is that
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“wicked” problems associated with maintaining the Law of the River well into the
21st century are so complex that decision-makers must have a certain level of
expertise and be enough on the same page to negotiate mutually acceptable
goals. Fleck claims that broadening the network of decision-makers to include
more diverse interests and points of view would create “…the risk of constant
conflict. A free-for-all could crash our system and leave someone the loser—it is
hard to know who—without the water on which the community has come to
depend” (p. 10).
Fleck repeatedly emphasizes that social capital is as important as physical
infrastructure (pp. 10, 162). He quotes political economist Elinor Ostrom’s
definition of social capital: “the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules,
and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to
a recurrent activity” (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 1999, p. 176). Much of Fleck’s
book consists of examples, including the story of the 2014 pulse flow, to
demonstrate how he believes this works. Fleck (2019) insists that this informal
network of experts “are the ones who have to figure out how our society can live
with less water. This is where our adaptive capacity must come from” (p. 10).
Fleck believes that the management of the Colorado River Basin is
decentralized such that “no one is in charge of the whole system” (p. 30) and
“there is no one big policy lever that can be pulled” (p. 23) to impose mandates
on all users. While it is true that a complex mix of federal, state, local, and private
entities are responsible for the management of the Colorado River, his
perspective should be considered alongside his agreement with former Deputy
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Interior Secretary Mike Connor that the US Secretary of the Interior and other
federal agencies should not impose “some grand solution… from on high” (p.
200). Fleck claims that appropriators are more willing to negotiate voluntary
water reductions under the threat of Congressional or Supreme Court
interventions, despite his belief that grand solutions imposed from above are
otherwise unproductive.
Fleck claims that the problem of the overallocation of the Colorado River
can no longer be ignored, given climate change and expanding development in
the West that harden legal claims to water, yet he is optimistic that ongoing
conservation efforts combined with developing institutions that will facilitate the
creation of "water-sharing agreements" will stabilize the system (pp. 8, 16-18,
193-194, 197-198). Fleck claims that these agreements can be arrived at through
network governance, with the participants consisting largely of water experts,
urban water brokers and farmers (senior appropriators), but he also calls for the
inclusion of certain underrepresented groups in negotiation and decision-making
circles, such as tribal governments, environmentalists, and diplomats
representing the nation of Mexico (pp. 161-174, 197). He believes that although
these groups have conflicting interests, the cultivation of social capital through
informal collaborative efforts is an essential element of successful negotiations
for broad-based voluntary water reductions to prevent water shortages or the
involvement of the courts when conditions of shortage arise (pp. 194-198).
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California Water Management in the 21st Century
The authors of this Stanford Law School policy paper are mainly lawyers
who declare that current California water management practices are “ineffective,
inefficient, and injurious” (Sivas et al. 2017, p. 8). Sivas et al. support this claim
by pointing to the degradation of the state’s waterways to argue that current
water management practices are unsustainable for the environment, and
statistics that indicate over 1 million Californians do not have access to safe,
reliable, affordable sources of drinking water as evidence that the state’s current
water management practices create unacceptable water wealth inequities (p. 22).
Although the authors describe the state’s historic overallocation of water rights as
problematic, the central issue presented is one of ethics; they believe that is
reprehensible for the state’s rights-based system of water management to enrich
senior appropriators while so many residents do not have access to water to
meet basic needs. The story of Humberto Lugo, who pumps untreated water
from an IID irrigation ditch for showers and washing dishes is not mentioned in
this paper, although it clearly illustrates the authors’ description of water wealth
inequities caused by the state’s current water management practices. The
prescriptions put forth in this policy paper touch on the broader subject of ethics
as it relates to the purpose of society (p. 22). Is society organized to enrich a
minority of people, or to empower the public to create communities and
governance structures that serve the well-being of the majority?
Sivas et al. call attention to the values that support California’s current
water management practices. Concepts like “sustainable” and “efficient” water
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management practices align with particular values; if water is critically lifesustaining in nature, as the authors of this policy paper claim, the health of
ecosystems and the necessity for living beings to access clean water is
prioritized. If, as stated in the 1992 United Nations Dublin Principles, “Water has
an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an
economic good” (ICWE, 1992), then sustainable water use supports continuing
economic growth, and the most efficient uses of water are those that generate
the most profit. Sivas et al. (2017) are firm in their position that “water is first and
foremost a public good to be allocated for human and environmental needs” (p.
13). They describe water’s life-sustaining nature as incompatible with water
managed as an economic good and allocated through markets, because markets
benefit users who can pay the most for it and exclude those who are unable to
participate in markets, including ecosystems (p. 6). Furthermore, water markets
harden demand because conserved water is sold for other uses (p. 20) and that
there has been no evidence of markets in California re-directing conserved water
back to the environment or to serve disadvantaged communities (p. 16). Water
markets function when appropriators have adjudicated (legally validated) water
rights, but it is improbable that the bulk of water rights issued statewide will ever
be fully adjudicated. Sivas et al. claim that it is unfair for senior appropriators who
benefit from historic “giveaways of the public’s water” to also profit from the
“political allocation” of taxpayer-subsidized water, whether their profits are
derived from the production of commodities or the transfer of their allocations to
other water users (p. 17). The authors claim that although water markets are
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often promoted as the best solution for dealing with the state’s water
management problems, they are far more likely to undermine water management
practices that safeguard the state’s waters (p. 28).
Sivas et al. (2017) disagree with the perspective that seniority rightsbased water allocation systems must be maintained, and claim that that the
power of government can and should respond to the political will of the public:
We are not prisoners to our existing allocation structure. We can take back
our power of thoughtful, informed choice based on social and ecological
criteria. We can choose to do this carefully, based on our values, or we
can let climate change and commodification do it for us, in ways we may
not like. We can choose to protect small towns and fish populations over
further expansion of massive corporate farms. We can choose to prioritize
growing healthy food for local (low greenhouse gas) consumption, over
exporting luxury foods or heavily subsidized animal feed. We could
support land retirement for positive social uses, such as wildlife habitat.
We can do this all under existing law, including through the waste and
unreasonable use doctrine, the public trust doctrine, and other protective
measures that ensure that California’s waters are respected for their lifesustaining essence (p. 23).
Sivas et al. emphasize that this shift from defining and managing water as
property and an economic good to managing water as a public and
environmental good can be accomplished with current California water laws,
specifically Water Code Section 275 regarding waste and unreasonable use,
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which constrains the use of water rights (p. 26). The authors argue that the
definition of waste and unreasonable use evolve along with societal and
environmental goals, so Californians do not need to accept water allocation
decisions that were designed to address conditions that existed a century ago (p.
26). Sivas et al. point to five recommendations5 made by the former Chief
Counsel of the State Water Board and Delta Watermaster Craig M. Wilson, which
outline how the State Water Board can use the waste and unreasonable use
doctrine proactively rather than as solely an enforcement mechanism, to prioritize
societal and environmentally beneficial uses of water over seniority-based
allocations (p. 27). The authors suggest that another powerful, yet under-utilized
tool is the public trust doctrine, which also “evolves over time according to
changing social values” (p. 27). Although Sivas acknowledge that the public trust
doctrine has rarely been applied, most notably in the Audubon case that
protected Mono Lake from the City of Los Angeles exercising its water rights,
they describe the application of the public trust doctrine as an essential element
in any strategy that aims to manage water as a life-sustaining public and
environmental good (p. 27). It should be noted that Sivas et al. do not call for the
elimination of seniority rights-based allocations. They propose that the waste and
unreasonable use provisions within the California Constitution and the public
trust doctrine can be interpreted and applied more broadly to enable allocations
directed for socially and environmentally beneficial uses to be prioritized over
rights-based allocations (p. 27). The authors believe that expanding the
interpretations of these provisions is justified because of the state’s fiduciary duty
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to future generations to protect its waterways, as well as to satisfy public welfare
regulations like the HRTWA (p. 27).
Sivas et al. believe that a comprehensive vision guiding water
management decision-making should not be designed by those who have
expertise in water management. The authors call attention to the difference
between why and how we manage water; in a democracy, the broadest spectrum
of the public should determine why we manage water, and experts can handle
the technical aspects of how to carry out the public’s priorities. Sivas et al. use
the example of public involvement in the California Redistricting Commission as
an initial template for how the public can be involved in California water
governance:
The Redistricting Commissioners conducted significant outreach to get the
public’s input in drawing new lines. This included speaking to the media,
holding public meetings, streaming meetings online, and providing a
website that included Commission records and documents. For the first
map drawing, they held 34 public meetings in 32 locations around the
state. More than 2,700 people participated in person and over 20,000
submitted comments. After the draft set of maps was released, the
Commission held 11 more public meetings to collect reactions and
comments. Majority votes were needed by the Commission to submit the
final maps. Though the final redistricting maps were challenged in courts,
they were upheld unanimously in the California Supreme Court and in the
U.S. District Court (p. 58).
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Conversely, the authors point to the two Water Commissions in 1912 and 1978
as not achieving meaningful changes in water governance because the interests
of water-poor communities and waterways were not represented, despite
statewide public hearings (p. 56).
Not all of what the authors promote is unorthodox. They support the
acquisition of instream water rights as an aspect of more comprehensive
strategies to protect waterways, including legal recognition of waterways'
inherent right to exist (p. 29). They call for transparent collection of data on
stream flows and groundwater levels to achieve better oversight of water
withdrawals, to prevent illegal diversions, and for the enforcement of existing
water regulations (pp. 30-31). Incentives for urban and agricultural water users to
reduce their demand must also ensure that conserved water does not support
new water uses (p. 32). They also compare how land-use laws have evolved
from the title phase to current regulations that include nuisance laws and zoning
restrictions and suggest that water laws can also evolve in a similar direction (p.
22).
Sivas et al. accuse California of lacking a comprehensive vision for water
management, and in its absence the state’s “ad hoc, reactionary approach” grafts
water management tactics on to a dysfunctional, historic seniority rights-based
allocation system (p. 10). The authors support the enforcement of the state’s
current water laws but strongly advocate for a broad spectrum of the public to
establish a “water vision” respects the value of water as a public and
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environmental good, and for the development of meaningful ways for the public
to participate in implementing and overseeing their water vision (p. 35).
Analysis
1. How does each of the two texts characterize what water is?
Sivas et al. repeatedly define water as undeniably a “public and
environmental good, of a critical life-sustaining nature (p. 4). Fleck does not
explicitly define what water is, although he characterizes water primarily as an
economic good, and supports the preservation of the doctrine of prior
appropriation for structuring the allocation of Western waters. He is absolute that
we must accept allocation decisions that were made about a century ago,
including the 1922 Colorado River Compact, which overestimated the average
flow of the Colorado River and resulted in the overallocation of water rights. Fleck
does not criticize the development of sprawling Western cities that Colorado
River water enabled, although he does mention in passing the political corruption
associated with the overbuilding of Western water infrastructure (Fleck, 2019,
p.4). Sivas et al. do not promote economic growth as a societal goal, but instead
on the notion that a society should be judged by how it treats its most vulnerable
members (Sivas et al., 2017, p. 4). Sivas et al. insist that the public must be clear
about the ethics that they want to be incorporated into water management
practices, and that begins with a clear definition of what water is.
If Fleck found it too difficult or unnecessary to characterize what water is,
in his defense this is not so simple, because water has political, ecological, and
economic dimensions. The Director of the Program of Water Governance at the
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University of British Columbia, Karen Bakker describes this complexity: “It is
simultaneously an economic input, an aesthetic reference, a religious symbol, a
public service, a private good, a cornerstone of public health, and a biophysical
necessity for humans and ecosystems alike” (Bakker, 2014, p. 471). Some
hydrosocial cycle advocates suggest that water is a social product; how a society
defines water indicates how water and society have co-created each other over
time (Linton, 2010). Neither text offers such an intellectually esoteric analysis of
the relationship between water and society in the Western United States in the
21st century, but that itself is revealing. Although both texts mention climate
change as a factor that is stressing current Western water management
practices, neither explicitly acknowledges that climate will change society as it
changes society’s relationship with water.
Both texts agree that climate change will stress current Western water
management practices to the breaking point if changes are not made. Sivas et al.
claim that Californians must change their relationship with water by managing it
as essential for life rather than as property if the public desires to protect
ecosystems, save native species from extinction, and serve the needs of
disadvantaged communities. Sivas et al. (2017) support the idea that waterways
have an inherent right to exist:
If water rights are the legal system by which water is allocated to humans,
then the law should also recognize the inherent rights of rivers to flow, and
the rights of fish to swim. Such laws would level the playing field for
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waterways and better guide us to modify our behavior to reflect their
needs (p. 29).
Fleck (2019) also believes that “we will come to terms with our new reality”
shaped by climate change, but he does not see society changing other than for
the public to do more with less (p. 207). He does not refer to water as an
environmental good, although he begins and ends his book with the 2014 pulse
flow story, and names environmentalists as having been unjustly excluded from
CRB policymaking. He disagrees with Sivas et al. that waterways like the
Colorado River have an inherent right to exist and that their rights deserve legal
recognition and protection. Fleck admonishes that the primary value of the
Colorado River is economic, so any notion of extending rights to the Colorado
would be too unfair and economically destabilizing for the communities that rely
on legally sanctioned appropriations from it:
We can debate whether it was a good idea throughout the twentieth
century to allocate so much water in this way. But that's done. Farmers
like Herkenhoff in places like San Acacia made good-faith decisions about
where to build their homes and how to make a living based on a national
policy of subsidizing irrigation water and the infrastructure needed to
deliver it. Change requires that we come to grips with the reality that the
Colorado's history has made it a working, agricultural river, and that
communities built their lives around those choices (p. 19).
Fleck does not question the doctrine of prior appropriation because he
values water as a form of property and as an economic good, but he
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acknowledges that the enforcement of seniority during conditions of water
shortage would be politically untenable. He quotes Mike King, the former director
of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources: “I don’t care what you think
about the Law of the River, we are not going to dry up a city of 2 million people”
(p. 197). King is saying that it would be politically untenable for the IID to receive
allocations to grow alfalfa in the desert while cities like Phoenix, AZ receive no
water at all. Complex layers of rules have been implemented to prevent the
system from collapsing under conditions of water shortage, but Fleck does not
believe that revisiting the 1922 Colorado River Compact to address the problem
of overallocation should be considered:
…we have no omniscient power giving us the ability to decide which water
uses will continue. When we decide our future, the Imperial Valley and Las
Vegas are at the table, defending their right to exist. As a result, the only
tractable plans are ones that work with current water users (pp. 7-8).
Presumably this refers to the legal concept of “takings” in which the holders of
property must be fully compensated when the government seizes private
property to implement a societal goal (i.e. eminent domain.) In tandem with the
issue of takings, Fleck (2019) claims that there are “questions of justice and
equity” regarding the protection of longstanding investments people have made
in the rural agriculture-based communities along the Colorado River, which
underlines his belief that fairness is associated with maintaining the economic
value of water (pp. 7, 19, 136).
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Sivas et al. strenuously object to the management of water as property
capital and describe California’s seniority rights-based allocation system as
dysfunctional for being based on the values of profit and exclusion. They are
unequivocal that markets are fundamentally incompatible with water’s nature as
essential for life and as a public and environmental good.
Fleck (2019) does not refer explicitly to water as an economic good, but
he continuously lauds its economic value by advocating for the creation of
institutions that facilitate “water-sharing agreements” that direct water to its most
profitable, therefore most economically efficient uses:
As we will see, getting the institutional infrastructure right—arranging a
deal between willing buyers and sellers, agreeing on a way to measure
the saved water and get it to the alternative uses, changing the rules so it
can be moved from one place to another—is a much harder problem.
Corky Herkenhoff would be happy to work out a deal, for a price, to
share some of the Colorado River water he currently spreads on his alfalfa
fields with one of the central New Mexico cities to the north.
So far, the cities have not been parched enough to need to work
out such a deal, but it is easy to imagine what it might look like: In a dry
year, the city pays Herkenhoff to lay off the irrigation, sending some of his
water to the city’s municipal treatment plant. Herkenhoff takes the money
and heads to Florida to go fishing. The barriers here are in the rules and
procedures—the institutions through which we manage the water.
Currently, New Mexico water law and policy don’t allow a deal like that.
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But as water gets scarcer, pressure to reduce those barriers will grow (pp.
28-29).
What Fleck is describing is a water market by another name. He uses the words
“water market” only once in his book, as something “that economists had long
dreamed of to improve the efficiency of California’s water allocations” (p. 140).
Fleck refers to the “use it or lose it” aspect of prior appropriation as hindering
water conservation efforts because “beneficial uses” do not typically include
conservation, so appropriators have no incentive to conserve water if their
allocations are reduced proportionally to the amount of water that they do not use
(p. 193). When water is managed as an economic good, “efficient” water use
means that water is directed towards the most profitable uses, rather than to
maintain the full allocation of one’s water right. Sivas et al. object to this definition
of efficient water use because profit is prioritized and water is directed away from
more socially and environmentally beneficial water uses, like allowing conserved
water to remain in the environment.
Both texts agree that the overallocation of appropriative water rights is
unsustainable, but they define sustainability differently, and their prescriptions for
solving the problems associated with overallocation reflect their opposing visions
and definitions of water. Fleck proposes that "water-sharing agreements" and
"network governance" are strategies to work around overallocation while leaving
seniority rights-based allocation of the River’s flow intact. From Fleck’s
perspective, sustainability requires the preservation of ecosystems so that they
maintain the Colorado River’s economic value for appropriators, therefore water
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must be managed primarily as property and as an economic good. Sivas et al.
also propose to work around the problem of overallocation, except they suggest
a strategy for overriding California’s seniority rights-based allocation system by
prioritizing new water management practices based on the value of water as a
life-sustaining undeniably public and environmental good.
2. How does each text describe the role of expertise in Western water
management?
To move water from areas where it is abundant to arid regions involves
technological expertise. Historian Karl Wittfogel proposed that complex systems
for moving water are produced by managerial states with hierarchical, complex,
and sometimes despotic systems of governance; for example, small irrigation
ditches require physical labor and simple negotiations as to who performs that
labor, but societies that produce aqueducts for moving large quantities of water
require specialized classes of workers, such as skilled technicians that have an
understanding of engineering and hydrology, workers with police powers to
induce the less skilled to perform the hard labor associated with the upkeep of
the system and to protect the settlement from intruders, an elite to keep the
police in check, etc. (Wittfogel, 1957). Political theorist Timothy Mitchell, the
author of Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity provides an account
of the construction of massive infrastructure projects on the Nile River such as
the Aswan Dam, which harmed communities even as they empowered a class of
professionals who served the elite, and whose projects functioned less well for
the agriculture-based communities and the environment than the small scale
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irrigation practices that these projects replaced (Mitchell, 2002). There are
countless examples where experts with reputations for being the “smartest
people in the room” have made tragic, socially destructive decisions that
benefited primarily themselves or their class interests. In his 2019 book, Goliath
Matt Stoller critiques monopoly and muses without irony, “We didn’t always
organize our world around the ideas of highly educated technocrats with bad
judgment. We once could do greatness in our politics. So where was a tradition I
could honor?” (p. xiii).
Democracy is the solution that Sivas et al. point to by distinguishing
between why society does anything and the more technical aspects of how the
implementation of societal goals are accomplished. As water management has
become more technical, the public has largely relinquished to experts the power
to form a vision of why water is managed that guides policymaking and
management practices. Sivas et al. associate the why of water management with
ethics, values, and vision and the how with expertise. Water managers may
believe that the goals of the federal CWA and California’s HRTWA are
aspirational and seemingly naïve, but in a true democracy, expert opinions
concerning why water is managed cannot substitute for democratic decisionmaking processes and accountability, because a society’s foundational ethical
perspectives and the political will to realize societal goals must come from
citizens themselves. For this reason, Sivas et al (2017) insist that water must be
managed as a life-sustaining substance:
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…from the ground up, with the state sponsoring local policy discussions
that involve broad citizen representation, rather than just professional
water experts and large water stakeholders. This will be critical to
transform state policy from one in which water is treated as a private good
and allocated to entrenched interests, to one where water is treated as a
public and environmental good essential to the health of all life in
California (p. 25).
Sivas et al. call on the public to rethink their relationship with water and
create a comprehensive water vision that reflects their values and guides
policymaking. The authors want the public to challenge the “powerful elite” who
currently control California’s water management policymaking in part by
recruiting representatives from a diversity of disciplines who know how to
integrate the perspective of water as a life-giving public and environmental good
within the state’s water management practices (p. 35). “Democratic accountability
for the protection of the state’s water future is key, and the public must not only
be part of that discussion, but active participants in ensuring that agreements are
implemented” (p. 35). The authors recognize that values and ethics are rarely
discussed when experts craft water policies. Sivas et al., believe that experts can
support democratic decision-making processes by helping to enact societal
priorities that are determined by the broadest spectrum of the public.
Conversely, Fleck (2019) argues that a small network of professionals are
the ones who must maintain the Law of the River well into the 21st century: “They
are the ones who have to figure out how our society can live with less water. This
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is where our adaptive capacity must come from” (p. 10). Fleck provides examples
throughout the book that emphasize the critical role that the cultivation of social
capital serves in creating bonds between the experts of the network, which are
based on:
…a shared understanding of the resources, of one another’s needs, and
of the complex set of rules that govern water’s use. They have built trust
and reciprocity over years of working together across difficult boundaries.
Social capital is every bit as important and worthy of investment as
physical capital: the pumps, dams, and ditches we build to manage and
move our water (p. 10).
Fleck insists that the exclusive nature of “the network” of experts and major
stakeholders who have fairly aligned interests is “better than the alternative,
which is the risk of constant conflict. A free-for-all could crash our system and
leave someone the loser—it is hard to know who—without the water on which the
community has come to depend” (p. 10). Fleck repeatedly claims that “we” have
no practical or moral ability to determine who the major water users are or what
they use their water allocations for. Water experts and markets should determine
how Western water is allocated rather than any democratic process.
The experts and major stakeholders that constitute “the network” do not
question why the Colorado River should be managed, either. It is a settled
matter. Fleck is adamant that these imperatives were decided about a century
ago and we must continue to adapt to them today. The irony is that “the network”
preserves the status quo by displacing the politically accountable representatives
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of governmental agencies with opaque informal collaborations funded and
conducted largely by private interests (including “non-litigious” environmental
groups that receive large grants from corporate impact investors), and are
implemented in part through "water-sharing agreements" that profit private
interests. Fleck derisively recounts an environmental group’s “combative”
demand for the prioritization of allocations to meet environmental needs over
rights-based allocations, as “hopeless, strident, and naïve” when he refers to one
of the former members of this group who supposedly grew up enough to later be
admitted “into the inner sanctum of Colorado River policy debates” (p.173). This
is an example of how the interests of the public are regarded paternalistically if at
all by the experts of “the network.”
To answer to the question of what role does expertise play in each text’s
perspective on Western water management, Sivas et al. insist that the public
must envision water as a life-sustaining public and environmental good, and that
experts assist with carrying out that vision. Fleck entrusts experts and the major
stakeholders of “the network” to enact a vision of water as capital and property
through management practices such as "water-sharing agreements."
3. How does each text address issues of water justice?
Issues of water justice center on who has decision-making power and
access to resources and who does not. Historian Donald Worster claimed that
the 19th-century colonization of the arid American West, which was enabled by
the development of extensive irrigation infrastructure, entrenched oligarchy and
never resembled the romanticized vision of the West that Henry David Thoreau
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associated with “freedom, creativity, independence and equality” (Worster, 1985,
p. 7). Worster’s description of water management in the West is still relevant,
although the elite exercise their wealth differently than in the heyday of the state
hydraulic era that Worster refers to when private interests allied with government
actors to fund the pork-barrel projects that Marc Reisner described so well in
Cadillac Desert (Reisner, 1986). The late-20th century neoliberal push for the
privatization of public utilities, the involvement of unelected, democratically
unaccountable individuals into decentralized policymaking processes like “the
network,” and the promotion of markets to achieve efficient and equitable water
allocation is still advocated by neoliberal institutionalists6 like Fleck.
“Equitable” water management for Fleck does not support a human right
to water, or for the residents of disadvantaged communities like Humberto Lugo
to be included as important “stakeholders” in decision-making processes. For
Fleck, questions of “equity and justice” are limited to the preservation of
investments made in communities like Brawley, California, where the corporate
farmers of the IID have generated substantial profits by entering into "watersharing agreements" with the SCMWD, while the members of Humberto Lugo’s
household wash their dishes and take showers with untreated IID irrigation water.
From a legalistic perspective “equitable” Colorado River water allocation
concerns the interests of appropriators and has little to nothing to do with
provisioning disadvantaged communities that do not have access to safe,
affordable, reliable sources of water (Robison and Kenney, 2012).
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Fleck does not question whether seniority rights-based allocations
systems are socially just, unlike Sivas et al. who describe prior appropriation as
the historic giveaway of California’s waters. Fleck provides a brief account of how
Native American communities have been excluded from CRB decision-making
processes, including the negotiations of the 1922 Colorado River Compact. Fleck
(2019) describes the main problem as to where “the boundaries have been
drawn” regarding who are the essential stakeholders to include in decisionmaking processes: “The issue here is not so much barring people from
participating in the process as it is finding the right people to invite in” (p. 163).
Fleck mentions the 1908 Winters v. the United States and the 1963 Arizona v.
California as two Supreme Court decisions that expanded who is included within
the circle of decision-makers, but he describes marginalization not so much from
a social justice perspective, but one that has significant economic implications:
It [unquantified water rights] leaves the tribes, among the poorest
communities in the nation, without the water they need to strengthen their
communities and economies, and leave non-Native water users unsure
about how much may eventually be diverted for Indian use (p. 169).
The fourth risk is the long-festering problem of Native American
communities' rights to water. Unresolved, this uncertainty leaves these
communities without the water they need to prosper, and it also leaves a
cloud of uncertainty over other water users (p. 196).
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Fleck also includes Mexico and environmentalists as constituencies that have
been left out of CRB decision-making processes, but he frames the problem as
the potential for destabilizing uncertainty:
All these cases raise questions of environmental justice and suggest that
water managers need to find ways to make their efforts more inclusive.
But even if you ignore those moral questions, exclusion poses a risk.
Parties left out, who are harmed by decisions made by insular circles, can
derail important efforts to solve the basin’s problems (p. 174).
In short, “the network” must be broad enough to include those who have the
power to destabilize the Law of the River but limited as much as possible to
those who have a significant interest in sustaining it. Water managers are the
ones who must decide what “inclusive” water management entails, not the public.
Sivas et al. (2017) emphasize that that asking why a society manages
water is a matter of values, vision, and ethics: “Just as we need reliable
quantitative data to make solid decisions, we similarly need qualitative
information about the motivations, habits, traditions, and ethics that drive our
decisions, consciously or unconsciously” (p. 20). The authors explain that when
the ethic of water as capital or of markets is at play, the interests of the
environment and all of Californians are not considered while the court decisions
favor investors (p. 20):
If California continues to act within its current ethical framework, we can
expect only more of the same—more prioritization of existing, profit-driven
uses over ecological needs and basic human rights, more pressure to
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avoid data collection and public transparency, and more focus on
immediate water gratification at the expense of future generations” (p. 21).
Sivas et al. point to the injustice of California’s current water management
practices that reward billionaires like Stewart and Lynda Resnick, who use more
water for agricultural irrigation than every home in the city of Los Angeles
combined (p. 15). This example also calls attention to the fact that markets
exacerbate water wealth inequities because they tilt the playing field towards
those who have the resources to participate in markets, and away from those
cannot, like disadvantaged communities and the environment (p. 14). Sivas et al.
argue that markets imposed on seniority rights-based allocation systems are
particularly egregious because the most senior allocations are unreasonably
large considering today’s circumstances, and the most senior and wealthy
appropriators have the most to gain by gaming a water market, to which the
Resnick’s can attest. A particularly despicable scheme of the Resnick’s concerns
their involvement with the quasi-public Kern Water Bank. The Resnick’s bought
cheap subsidized agricultural water for the Kern Water Bank and sold it to
California’s Environmental Water Account at a profit of twenty cents to every
taxpayer dollar spent (pp. 47-48). At the time the banked water was needed so
that the Bay-Delta pumps could be shut off to prevent the native endangered
Delta smelt from being sucked into the pumps, as drought had already severely
reduced their numbers along with native Chinook salmon. Another way that San
Joaquin Valley appropriators gamed the system in 2014 was to sell their surface
allocations to other users and substitute those allocations with groundwater,
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which caused aquifer overdrafts and the destruction of thousands of domestic
and small community water system wells (p. 11).
The difference between the use of language in these two texts must be
noted. Sivas et al. use language that is clear and concise; the reader does not
need to interpret jargon or coded language to understand what the authors intend
to communicate. The following paragraphs succinctly summarize their
perspective:
In short, California’s current water allocation system is inefficient,
inequitable and injurious. It prioritizes current uses based on seniority, with
little regard for the impacts of those uses. It places the most vulnerable
populations and ecosystems at the back of the line when droughts occur,
as they do regularly now and will do with more frequency. The impacts of
those decisions on the health and well-being of Californians and California
species and ecosystems are widespread and growing. Action is needed
now to evolve our water governance system in a way that reflects the lifegiving and public nature of water and our utter dependence on water for
basic needs.
As reflected by numerous world leaders over the centuries, the
moral test of government, and the measure of its strength, is how it treats
its most vulnerable members. To ensure that California’s most at-risk
ecological and human populations receive the water that they need to
survive now and in the future, we must reform California’s water allocation
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system to prioritize the protection of life over privatization and profit (p.
12).
The first three sentences in the first paragraph refer to examples that are not
mentioned here but are described in detail in other parts of the text. One
previously-mentioned example of how the state’s water allocation system is
“inefficient, inequitable and injurious” and enables appropriators to use water in
ways that negatively impact vulnerable users, particularly during droughts was
Resnick’s Kern Water Bank paper shuffle. The Resnick’s enriched their bank
account at the expense of taxpayers and endangered species of native fish in the
Bay-Delta, in addition to undermining the effectiveness of the state’s
Environmental Water Fund. The fourth sentence that claims that the impacts of
Californians and California species and ecosystems are widespread and growing
also refers to examples that are not mentioned here but are described elsewhere
in the text, such as senior appropriators selling their surface water allocations
and substituting those allocations with groundwater. These appropriators were
never held to account for the damage they caused to aquifers and small
community water systems and domestic wells that resulted from their actions.
The evolution of the state’s water governance structures that the authors refer to
in the fourth sentence is described throughout the text, which begins with the
public’s recognition that water is a life-sustaining public and environmental good.
The second paragraph alludes to the moral weakness of California water
management practices, considering the millions of Californians that are denied
access to safe, affordable and reliable sources of clean water, like Humberto
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Lugo’s household. The last sentence in the second paragraph refers to the
possibility described elsewhere in the text regarding how socially and
environmentally beneficial uses of water could be prioritized over seniority-based
allocations.
Fleck’s writing requires interpretation. Some of the mechanisms Fleck
(2019) uses to manipulate language are apparent in the following paragraph:
If instead we recognize our ability to do more with less, and invest in
institutions that facilitate water sharing, we can create systems for robust,
flexible, and equitable water allocation. Only then can we preserve the
West that we all have come to inhabit, know, and love (pp. 6-7).
First, Fleck tells stories in a folksy tone to appeal to the reader, unlike the clear
declarative statements that Sivas et al. use. Fleck frequently refers to “we,” which
implies that the reader should share his perspective. Fleck refers to water
markets as “water-sharing agreements,” so this paragraph calls for investments
in the institutions7 that support their development (These “institutions” include
opportunities for members of the network to cultivate social capital, like the
biannual Bishop’s Lodge event that Ted Kowalski attends.) Fleck’s reference to
“robust, flexible, and equitable water allocation” partly reflects his perspective of
how markets function: “robust” means that the system of seniority rights-based
allocations and management can withstand shocks like periods of water
shortages (pp. 51, 103, 120, 125), “flexible” refers mainly to the creation of
"water-sharing agreements" along with water banking and various methods of
conserving water (pp. 7, 101, 120), and “equitable” indicates the protection of
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investments, not that any living being has an inherent right to water (p. 7, 19).
Fleck uses vague language to claim that his prescriptions for Western water
management are the “only” way (pp. 7, 8) that we can preserve “the West that we
have all come to inhabit, know, and love,” which translated means “the status
quo.” Humberto Lugo and Ted Kowalski no doubt have very different opinions
about whether they love the status quo.
Throughout his book, Fleck refers to “farmers” rather than senior
appropriators. Regardless of why he made this choice, the image of the family
farmer is much more appealing and identifiable than the affluent corporate
agribusiness owner. Fleck also uses the word “fight” derisively as a substitute for
politics. “Politics” is the struggle for power, but Fleck’s framing implies that that
seniority rights-based Western water allocation is a settled issue that should not
be challenged. An example of Fleck’s derisive use of “fighting” depicts the State
of Arizona’s refusal to participate in negotiations over the 1922 Colorado River
Compact as the actions of “the skinny kid,” “paranoid,” and “its own worst enemy”
whose “behavior is driven by psychology,” as though political contestation
indicates pathology (pp. 69, 190, 65). Contrast this characterization of Arizona
with that of Mary Austin, author of Land of Little Rain and resident of California’s
Owens Valley before the construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, as described
by Worster:
Sympathizing with Arizona’s complaint was the writer Mary Austin, who
saw in the compact a replay of the earlier Owens Valley—Los Angeles
controversy, where the smaller, weaker party lost out to the more powerful
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one while the federal government looked on and abetted. Now along the
Colorado the government was once more throwing all its aid to the
invading party, giving to the Californians residing in Los Angeles and
Imperial Valley 4.4 million acre-feet a year of the basin’s apportionment—
the lion’s share. Austin wrote of “the rape of the natural resources of one
State against that State’s consent, for the advantage of another State”
(Worster, 1985, pp. 209-210).
If Fleck’s perspective represented the interests of the public, he would not
need to couch his arguments in the jargon of economics. According to Open
Markets Institute fellow Matt Stoller, “The point of economics as a discipline… is
to create a language and methodology for governing that hides political
assumptions from the public… The current discipline of economics seeks to
displace people who believe in democratic mechanisms for governing” (Siman,
2020). Fleck tries to persuade readers that the experts of “the network” are the
most capable and worthy of creating the vision that guides Western water
management practices. Sivas et al. use clear, concise language to educate and
motivate the public to claim the power to determine California’s water
management priorities, as part of the larger project of creating a democratic
society that reflects the public’s ethics and values. Fleck only needs to convince
the reader that the status quo must be maintained because democracy is scary
and chaotic, so experts and market forces should determine society’s goals.
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Conclusion
What is the vision of water that guides Western water management, and
who gets to determine the vision? These two texts present contesting visions of
what water is that guides Western water management practices, who should
enact their visions, and what defines injustice as it relates to water allocation.
These contesting perspectives on Western water governance illustrate the
ideological divide between the aspirations and the results of how water
regulations like the HRTWA are enacted.
Fleck believes that the Law of the River can be maintained if institutions
are created that facilitate "water-sharing agreements” that move water from
agriculture to urban uses. These agreements must be negotiated by an informal
network of water management professionals, farmers and urban water brokers
who collaborate to achieve voluntary broad-based reductions of water use. Fleck
calls on the inclusion of groups that have been marginalized in water negotiations
in the past to be included in “the network,” such as tribal governments,
environmentalists, and diplomats representing the nation of Mexico, He couples
the actions of the network with science-based methods of water conservation,
and changes in the rules that govern water use as part of a comprehensive
prescription for avoiding conditions of water scarcity on the Colorado River that
could trigger the involvement of the courts.
Sivas et al. claim that California water governance is “inefficient,
ineffective, and injurious” in large part due to the state’s seniority rights-based
systems of water allocation. They argue that because the state’s waters are
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managed as property and an economic good, water allocations are directed
towards the most profitable uses and away from the most socially and
environmentally beneficial uses. The authors believe that this explains the
declining health of aquatic ecosystems, and why California has over 1 million
residents do not have access to safe, affordable, reliable access to water for
drinking and hygiene. Sivas et al. do not call for the elimination of seniority-based
water allocations, but for the courts to broaden the application of the reasonable
use and public trust doctrines, so that the public can prioritize specific socially
and environmentally beneficial water uses over seniority-based allocations. They
also compare how land-use laws have evolved from the title phase to current
regulations that include nuisance laws and zoning restrictions and suggest that
water laws can also evolve in a similar direction. Sivas et al. emphasize that the
public needs to recognize what the current operating vision of water is and what
they want it to be before major reforms of water management practices are
possible.
Regarding the question of how each text defines what water is, Sivas et
al. unequivocally claim that water is a life-sustaining public and environmental
good. Fleck refers to the primary value of water as a form of property an
economic good through most of the stories he tells in his book, which represents
the status quo of Western water management.
The role of expertise in water management, according to Sivas et al., is
that the value of water must be decided democratically by the broadest spectrum
of citizens if water’s life-sustaining nature is to be realized in water management
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practices. The authors draw a clear distinction between why water is managed,
which should be democratically determined by the public, and how water is
managed, which involves expertise guided by explicit societal goals. Sivas et al.
believe that this process of democratically involving the public in water
management begins with educating the public on water issues through public
forums. The authors pointed to two water commissions, one in 1912 and the
other in 1978, that arose out of water crises and changed California water
governance. In both cases the interests of waterways and water-poor
communities were not represented, despite public hearings held throughout the
state in 1978. Sivas et al. use the example of public involvement in the California
Redistricting Commission as a potential template for how the public can be
included in the management of the state's waters. The authors suggest that
efforts to educate the public on water management issues will help to create the
political will necessary to support broader interpretation and application of the
reasonable use and public trust doctrines in California’s Constitution.
Fleck is suspicious of democratic processes as too chaotic and uncertain,
so he regards the question of why water is managed as the purview of an
exclusive network of water experts, farmers, and urban water brokers, although
he calls for broadening the informal decision-making circle to include
underrepresented groups such as tribal governments, environmentalists, and
diplomats representing Mexico. Fleck believes that the problems associated with
maintaining the Law of the River well into the 21st century are so complex that
decision-makers must have a certain level of expertise and be enough on the
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same page to negotiate mutually acceptable goals. Fleck claims that broadening
the network of decision-makers to include more diverse interests and groups
beyond those he specifies would create “the risk of constant conflict.”
Water justice concerns who have decision-making power and access to
resources and who does not. Sivas et al. want to eliminate “water wealth
inequities” that threaten the health of living beings. The authors are not just
referring to humans, but also ecosystems and the life forms associated with them
as vulnerable populations whose interests must be represented in water
management decision-making processes. These authors assert that the interests
of the public will not be represented in water governance decision-making
processes if there are no mechanisms for the public to democratically participate.
It should be noted that Sivas et al. do not advocate for the elimination of water
rights, and although they do not mention reserve rights in their policy paper, their
emphasis on water justice implies that they do not intend to challenge the
seniority of allocations for tribes.
Fleck defines injustice mainly as threats to investments that were made
based on historic allocations of water, although he does mention that certain
groups have been underrepresented in water governance processes that should
be included, if not for moral reasons, to provide certainty for established water
users regarding their allocations, particularly during times of water scarcity. Fleck
does not acknowledge a human right to water, or a waterway’s inherent right to
exist.
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The comparison of these two texts demonstrates that two different
ideologies are at play in Western water governance. Currently, Western waters
are managed primarily as property and an economic good, but the public
probably understands little of this, and identifies more with the vision of “water is
life.” California’s HRTWA is an example of a regulation that aspires to do much
more than it is able, given the state’s seniority rights-based systems of water
allocation. Sivas et al. make a strong case that Western water management
practices will not serve the public interest unless the public can democratically
determine what that vision is and play a meaningful role in its implementation and
oversight. Although California water governance has never been democratic, the
authors point to the public’s involvement in the California Redistricting
Commission as an initial template for how the public can become involved in the
state’s water governance processes. If the public prefers to value water as an
economic good, Fleck’s prescriptions for water management might make sense,
but Fleck is not clear with his readers that the public’s interests take a back seat
to profit. It is probably not possible to reconcile these two contesting visions of
water governance.
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Afterword
The most disconcerting aspect of Fleck’s book is his omission of the
Walton Family Foundation’s unprecedented influence on Colorado River
policymaking and management through funding, education, and the coordination
of nonprofit groups that were present in examples Fleck provides of successful
network governance, like the 2014 Colorado River Delta pulse flow. Fleck does
not mention Ted Kowalski or the critical role WFF funding plays to enable
collaborations that Fleck gushes about, including river rafting trips, WEF retreats
at Bishop's Lodge and their advocacy of water markets.
All environmental organizations invited to participate in “the network” have
received WFF funding. In the qualitative section of her Oxford dissertation,
doctorate candidate Gina Gilson interviewed recipients of WFF grants, which
included thirteen representatives of environmental organizations, one consultant,
a couple of people affiliated with universities, a government employee, and one
representing a foundation, all of whom remain anonymous (Gilson, 2018). One
interviewee expressed “that signing on to a “Walton approach” is essential to be
a “player” in the CRB” (p. 38). Many of the interviewees made statements
echoing the claim that their organization would not have a “seat at the table
without philanthropic funding to keep us over there” (p. 40), or have the ability to
work collaboratively with other groups on Colorado River projects without WFF
funding and assistance with developing their organization’s technical expertise
(p. 29). One interviewee admitted that “having philanthropic dollars allows
conservation groups to try innovative solutions without the scrutiny of the
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taxpayers” (p. 32). Although some of the interviewees objected to the idea that
the Foundation had any influence on their work, one acknowledged that grantees
are “more likely to respond to the needs of their funder to keep the relationship,
and when a group on the outside disagrees or wishes to comment on the
strategies, it’s difficult for that group to make a case” (p. 37). Similar critical
comments included that a market-based approach upholds the status quo and
avoids addressing the root causes of problems, the focus on water markets
drowns out other approaches, and if their approach was wrong, alternatives were
not being tested (p. 37).
Philanthrocapitalism, venture philanthropy, impact investment—whatever
the label--is more pervasive and problematic than commonly recognized, and
Western water management is only the tip of the iceberg. The $100 million that
the WFF dispersed over five years to influence Colorado River policymaking is
small change when compared with the one billion that Michael Bloomberg
spends on philanthropy every year, which has had considerable influence on
elections, according to The Intercept journalist Lee Fang:
Here in the 21st century we have a different type of political machine. We
have an interlocking network of big corporate foundations, corporate
consultants, lobbyists and nonprofits run by a group of people who are
friends, who have a similar kind of neoliberal ideology, that have incredible
influence in the political process… Bloomberg has the same style as a 21st
century political machine, but instead he has this billion dollar a year
philanthropy that has trained hundreds of mayors… Go to any city in
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America; the mayor there has likely attended a Bloomberg boot camp and
has received a Bloomberg “innovation” grant… This type of money has not
been seen in American politics before… If you actually show the entire list
of Democratic lobbyists, consultants, and thinktank people who have
worked for Bloomberg or received Bloomberg money, that’s a very long
list (Useful Idiots, 2020).
This type of philanthropy is not new; it was common during the Gilded Age.
These are political down payments that aim to undermine democratic processes
in favor of plutocracy. New York Times writer Anand Giridhardas describes the
purpose of philanthrocapitalism as “bribing society at large” and a strategy
employed by oligarchs in their a “40-year war on the idea of government” to
achieve “refeudalization” (Johnson, 2019). The subject of philanthrocapitalism
broadly and its impact on policymaking, democracy, and democratic
accountability is not well understood and requires further study.
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Endnotes
1 The

four tenets of the Walton Family Foundation’s work on the Colorado

River:
First, it wanted to test whether water markets would work for agriculture,
cities and the river. It even coined the term "conservationomics" for its
environmental work, though it later abandoned it…. Second, it expanded
financing for agricultural and urban water efficiency. Third, it worked to
improve flows and riparian habitat. And fourth, it supported the
development of drought plans and other water agreements (Jacobs, April
17, 2019).
2 The

Law of the River:

The Colorado River is managed and operated under numerous compacts,
federal laws, court decisions and decrees, contracts, and regulatory
guidelines collectively known as the “Law of the River.” This collection of
documents apportions the water and regulates the use and management
of the Colorado River among the seven basin states and Mexico (US
Dept. of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation, 2020).
3 https://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/bookreview/multiple
4 The

“tragedy of the commons” was defined by Garrett Hardin in a 1968

essay, and is described in the title of an article in Scientific American as: “The
man who wrote one of environmentalism’s most-cited essays was a racist,
eugenicist, nativist and Islamaphobe—plus his argument was wrong”
(Mildenberger, 2019). Harden’s theory describes humans as inherently selfish,
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such that they will race each other to use up available (common-pool)
environmental resources to the point of their destruction if they are not prevented
from doing so. His theory is used to justify the privatization of common-pool
resources.
5 Craig

M. Wilson’s list of five recommendations that “can comprehensively

address the inefficient use of water in California”:
1. Create a Reasonable Water Use Unit within the State Water Board’s
Division of Water Rights, which would enforce the prohibition against the
waste or unreasonable use of water, with a focus on using doctrine to
promote more efficient use of water in a wide variety of settings;
2. Streamline the procedures for enforcement actions against waste and
unreasonable use, starting with the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order;
3. Conduct one or more adjudicatory proceeding(s) regarding inefficient
agricultural water use;
4. Employ the reasonable use doctrine to promote more efficient agricultural
water use or methods of use, including water delivery system/irrigation
scheduling improvements and improved conservation practices; and
5. Revise state water plans to specifically incorporate the efficient use of
water, pursuant to the doctrine.
6 Fleck’s

views on water management also align with Bakker’s definition of

neoliberal institutionalism:
Governments should leave as much scope for market mechanisms as
reasonably possible and restrict their role to that of umpire, regulator, and
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facilitator. Within this framework of government oversight, market
mechanisms can achieve our desired environmental and economic goals.
In order for this to occur, we need to “get the institutions right”: hence the
focus of public-policy debate in recent years on concepts such as social
capital, good governance, and institutional economics. We might term this
set of ideas “neoliberal institutionalism” (Bakker 2014, 215-216).
Bakker’s more broad definition of market environmentalism is also relevant:

(Bakker, 2014; p. 476)
7 Fleck

quotes UNM economics instructor Bob Berrens’ definition of

institutions: “Institutions are the rules, both formal and informal, that both liberate
and constrain behaviors in repeated interactions” (Fleck, 2019; p. 206).
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